"Broadening the Horizons of Europe": Excerpts from a speech by Professor Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission, European Economic Community, in Oslo before the Norske Studentersamfund (Norway's oldest student society). European Community Information Service, 3 November 1960 by unknown
-.?
EI \} E}Q P tT ASSqommuffi[qsB
r xroatl[Ttftt s# rtYtge
2SS gouth*rn Eulrdlng, Washlngton 5, D.C.
telofrhnne HAtlanll *-AO"A
corf,lf,o]{ uaRt(ET . EURAT(,T
I'BROADENING THE HORIZONS
G(,AL & !sTEEL G(,UMU]lITY
Norrember 3, 1960
OP EUROPEI'
Excerpts from a Speech by
PROTESSOR I{ALTER HALLSTEIN
Presldent of the Comnisslon, European Econotrlc Comnunlty
Oslo, November 3, 1960
Before the
Norske Studentersanfund (tlorruayrs oldest student society)
If one concluslon beglns to emerge
have all put lnto the problens of Ehe Six
(European Etee Trade Assoclatlon), iE may
have been t,oo Barroro.
from the hard thinklng that we
(Comnon Market) and the Seven
be that, in the past our horl.zons
We have thought and talked a great deal about such solutl.ons as free
trade areas, customs unions, full menbership, partlal association, and the
Llke; but I wonder wheLher rile may not all have been a Little too narrow ln
our approach. There are, afLer all, more than Just our thlrEeen naElons ln
Europe. Besldes, the natlons of Europe have naoy other frlends -- veEy
geuerous frlends, who greatly asslsted postwar recoveryo Perhaps, therefore,
we need to look beyond our specific European problems tn seeking nel lrays
of solvlng them.
As an example of one of the ways whtch we ought not to leave out of
consl.deration, I would llke to quote a suggestlon wtrlch recently came from
the Asslstant Secretary General to Ehe General Agreement on Tarlffs and
Trade (C,ATT). Ihls lras t,o the effect that the development of both the
Community and the EEIA lnto 
'tlow tarlff clubs" rnlght ln itself lead Eo a
solution of the lnternal European problem, which would ln turn offer
advantages to our frlends across the AELantlc as well. Thls ls one possi-
blllty. But whaLever the solution, I am lncltned to think that lt w111 be
developed ln stages, plece by plece, and, in the meantlme, anythtng that
rile can do here and now to reduce practical dlfflculCles, to brlng the Slx
and the Seven cLoser together, around the conference table with thelr
other frlends and tradlng partners, can make a comprehensive solutlon
easler by renoving obstacles to a frank and fulL discussion of Lhe real
problems lnvolved.
A Matter of Peflnltlon: Ihq Meanlnq gf..UnlEy.
fhe essentlal problem of the so-calIed Slx and the Seven ls really a
problen of what ls meant by Europeatr unity. In a very real sense, the
Connnunlty ts one unit, Although its most publlclzed actions so far have
been ln the fleld of tarlffs and guotas, lt contalns many more far-reachlng
features. It alms aE settlng up a single horue market where capital, labor,
and servlces, as well as goods, wllL clrculate freely. Ihls enEalls Ehe
harmonlzation of legal systems and the appllcation of conmon ruIes. IE
also calls for comnon polLcles for agrlculture and for transport, coordi-
nation of monetary pol.icy, and comon responslbllity for reglonal develop-
menE and social pollcies deslgned to insure the harmontous development of
the economy.
The unity of Ehe Seven, on the other hand, ls of a less advanced
order. By thls I do not mean any sllght on the European Itee Trade
Assoctatlon or its members. It,s Scandinavlan members, in fact, were talk-
lng about the possibl.ltty of a l{ordlc cusEoms union three years before the
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Eembers of the European Economlc ComunlEy signed the Rome Treaty. And tf
the countries of the Seven have found lt easler to establish among them-
selves a less thorough-going degree of unlty, thls simply reflects thelr
parttcular situatlon as tndlvidual countrles.
Maior Differences Between the Six and the Seven
I an fully alrare of the varlous reasons which cause our frlends tn
the rest of Europe to find lE difficuLt to respond to Ehe Rome Treatyrs
standing lnvltation to Joln the Community. I aleo fuIly appreclate the
signlficance of Ehe European Ftee Trade Assoclatlon, especially to greaE
natlons rillth a long tradltion of sturdy lndependence.
The European Free Trade AssociaElon differs from the Community tn
that lt ls prlnclpally concerned with lndustrlal products. Secondl.y, tt
Ls an assocl.atlon for free trade between countrtes which retaln as much
as posslble of thelr national autonomy. t{lthout a common Lariff or a
conrmon poltcy for exterrral trade, lt ls less easy for the Seven to act as
a unit in lnternatlonal economic relatlons. Thirdl.y, the countrles of the
Seven, being concerned wlth Erade between separaEe naEions, do not at present
atm at achieving the other characteristlcs of a single home oarket, such as
completely free movement of capital, labor, and services. Their rules of
competiEion, llkewise, are far less comiprehensive than those ln Ehe Rome
Treaty; nor does the Stockhotm Gonventioa provide for con"non poLlcles, or
even for harmonizatlon of pollcy in the commercLal, social, or fiscal domaln.
The EEIA has no such lnstiiutlon as the European InvestmenE Bank or
the European Soclal E\rnd, which, tn the Comnunlty, represent the practical
acknowledgement of common responsiblllty ln these two fields. Finally, its
lnstltutions are very much looser and more tradiElonaL than those of the
Community. If ItSeven equals Onerrr lt ls a dlfferent kind of I'One'r than
that which equals t'Six.tt For this reason lE ls difficult to give a clear
and slmple answer Eo the seeningly slmple questlon of I'Six plus Seveu equals
what?tr It ls noE a questlon of addtng together trro separate figures, but
rather of puttlng together trilo belngs whlch are qulEe dlfferent.
I,lho Wants to Dlvide Europe?
I dontt Lhlnk anyone can doubt the need Eo get the Six and the Seven
together in some way. I am sure thaL no sEat,esman ln the world today would
be wllLlng to take the responslbility of "dlvlding Europertt for althoughthe concept of Europe as a whole ls a much Less deflnlte one than that of
Ehe Slx or even the Seven, I would not deny lts valldity. Indeed, lt ls for
that reason that, I thlnk we musE be very careful, whlle we avold divldtng
Europe, to avold at the same tLme any danger of dlssolving Europe and
partlcularly any danger of dissolvlng what ls so far the most lntenslve
form of untty yeE achleved withln Europe, whlch ls the European Community.
The problems of the Slx and the Seven are very real problems, and
e:<perlence has shown that they cannot Just be waLved maglcally away by glvlng
sone politlcal incantatl.on. I get very lnpaElent when I hear lt said thaE
"the Six-Seven problem ls only a matter of flnding Ehe politlcal will for
a solutlonrrt or rronly a mattetr of a few technical adjustnents on elther
side." Even if there wetre no other condltlons and considerations, lt would
stilL be extremely difftcult to work out the theoretical economics of a
simple narriage between the Slx and the Seven. Even the Rome TreaLy, whose
slgnatoriesl separate economles are somewhat, comparable, took two years Eo
work ouc, and lt had the experience of the European CoaL and SteeL Coununlty
to guide lt. Among the members of the Seven, already so dlfferent in alms
and structure from the Communlty, there are very great contrasts tn matters
of tradlng pollcy, degree of economic development, and so on. I know that
lt ls sometimes suggested that the pra$natlc approach carries wtth lt the
danger of distractlng attenElon from matters of principle, and that there-
fore no fundamenEal solution would ever be found. I say these fears are
groundless, for to oy roind the pragmaLl.c approach provtdes a way fornrard,
not a way back.
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The, Communityrs Pragmatlc Approach
The varlous actions the Conmunity has Eaken ln pursulng its pragmaElc
approach have included the follornring measures:
1. The adoption of a moderate external tariff based on the
simpLe arlthmetical average of the prevlous Eariffs,
representing conslderable tariff reductlons for lYance
and Ltaly, in parElcular.
2. The calculatl.on of the tarlff tn such a \ray that lts
average lncidence was beLow that of the prevlous natlonal
tariffs t,aken together.
3. The negotlatlon of List G tariffs to a Level whose incl-
dence rvas agaio below Ehat of the prevlous average.
4, The granttng of funportant concessions to the Communltyrs
Erading partners by the offer Eo extend to Ehem, on t$ro
occasions, many of the muEual advantages which the
CornmunLtyrs member states accorded'each other in the
process of Lowerlng inLernal trade barriers.
5. The decision to aboLlsh lndustrial quotas withln the
CommunLty by the end of 1961 and to make the same abolitlon
as soon as posslble vls-b-vls the resE of the world.
6. The acceptance of the Dlllon proposals for world-wide tariff
reductions of up to 20 per cent.
7. The proposal for a firrther round of substantial tariff re-
ductions to follow the Dillon negoElations.
8. Even before the Dll.lon negotiations, the provlslonal reductlon
of 20 per cent, ln the Cornmunltyrs external tariff in connection
with the acceleratlon of Ehe Common MarkeErs transitlon perlod.
9. Cooperatlon in formtng the Comrnittee of Twenty-one, lncludlng
the member nations of the Organlzatlon for European Economic
Cooperatlon, the United States and Canada, and the EEC
Commisslon, Eo study any dtfflcultles which Ehe CommunlEyrs
creation mlghE cause to its tradtng partnefs and the means of
renedylng those dtfficulties in conformlty with Ehe rules of
the GATT.
This l-ast provtso ls lmportant because the European issue is only one
aspect, of our tasks in the fleld of internatlonal economic reIat,lons. It, is
necessary Eo achleve a greater coordination of our aEEltudes ln the face of
two great econontc challenges -- the challenge of staEe tradlng countries
and the challenge, both human and economlc, of the developing countries.
lllth these challenges ln mind, the OEEC ls now belng transformed Jnto
the OrganlzaElon for European Cooperat,ion and Development, in which the
United States and Canada will be fulI partlcipants.
Thls refLects both the widening of our European horizons in general
and the looktng outward toward the probLems of the developlng countrles
in particular, They need from us speclal Ereagment, in the Eariff field
perhaps, and cert,ainly ln a greater cortrnon effort to coordlnate the prlces
of raw mat,erlals. Theyneed more multilateral aid; they need technical
assistance; they need, in fact, a concerted effort on the part of the ln-
dustriaLized nations of the West. That concerted effort we are no\il trying
to make. IE would be Eoo much to clalm that Ehe European Economic Community
ls solely responsible for thls new moveoent, any more than lL is responslble
for the problems which that, movement seeks to soLve. But I thlnk we may
reasonably clatn some soall share of the credtt, and, tn the process, I
think we may hope tshat by st.andlng stde by stde to solve these $rorLd
problems we shall flnd Ehat our European problems wlll become easier Eo
solve.
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